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RICHMOND: TAKE MY MORTGAGE, PLEASE! 
The burst of the housing bubble brought challenges for many homeowners, 
as the value of their homes spiraled downward and many were forced into 
foreclosure. This, in turn, has caused difficulties for cities, as the vacant and 
abandoned neighborhoods have become a hub for blight and transience, and 
the tax base has steadily declined. In an effort to combat these issues, 
Richmond, California’s mayor, Gayle McLaughlin, has teamed up with 
Mortgage Resolution Partners, LLC. The pair plans to use Richmond’s power 
of eminent domain to “take” underwater mortgages and then refinance them, 
selling the new mortgages to investors. The plan, however, has met staunch 
resistance from many, including banks, which represent the current mortgage 
holders, as well as the Federal Housing Finance Agency, which challenges the 
wisdom and legality of such a plan. In the battle that has ensued, both sides 
are standing strong. The opponents are especially worried that a victory for 
McLaughlin could spur other cities into action, resulting in huge losses for 
investors. This article posits that while Richmond’s plan is bold and likely has 
legitimate intentions, its constitutionality is questionable and its 
implementation could bring about catastrophic results. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
On Homer Avenue on the east side of Cleveland, Ohio, vacant homes litter 
the landscape. Although fewer than twenty houses line the street, seven of them 
sit empty and only two of those have been boarded and secured by the city. The 
vacant homes are in various states of disrepair. Their yards fill the weeds in 
the summer and a multiplicity of insects breed in the grass. Most of the houses 
have broken windows, chipped paint, and dislodged gutters. One house draws 
a number of people who engage in illicit activities during the evening hours. In 
addition to the empty houses, three once-vibrant commercial buildings sit 
empty as well. The factory at the end of the street provides one function for the 
neighborhood; teenagers amuse themselves from time to time by breaking the 
factory windows with rocks, leaving shattered glass strewn about the street. 
Two boarded school buildings dominate the other end of the street. Loose 
bricks occasionally cascade from the second stories, crashing to the street 
below. Although the current owner removed the rickety and rusty fire escapes 
that children previously climbed, poison oak plants still run the length of the 
building.1 
This scene is not an unfamiliar one for residents of cities across the 
country. Spurred by the burst of the housing bubble and the great recession, 
vacancy and abandonment continue to cause significant problems for cities.2 
The problem is multifaceted. The abandoned homes mark the deterioration of a 
neighborhood, inviting blight, crime, and transience. Even one dilapidated 
property signals to homeowners and potential buyers alike that the 
neighborhood is not a good investment.3 Malcolm Gladwell discusses this in 
his book, The Tipping Point: 
If a window is broken and left unrepaired, people will conclude that no one 
cares and no one is in charge. Soon, more windows will be broken and the 
sense of anarchy will spread from the building to the street on which it faces, 
sending a signal that anything goes.4 
 
 1. This hypothetical comes from the experience of Matthew J. Samsa. Matthew J. Samsa, 
Reclaiming Abandoned Properties: Using Public Nuisance Suits and Land Banks to Pursue 
Economic Redevelopment, 56 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 189, 190 (2008). 
 2. Kathleen C. Engel, Do Cities Have Standing? Redressing the Externalities of Predatory 
Lending, 38 CONN. L. REV. 355, 355 (2006). 
 3. James J. Kelly, Refreshing the Heart of the City: Vacant Building Receivership as a Tool 
for Neighborhood Revitalization and Community Empowerment, 13 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & 
COMMUNITY DEV. L. 210, 212 (2004). 
 4. This summary of Broken Windows Theory, from the journalist and author Malcolm 
Gladwell’s book, The Tipping Point, demonstrates how behavior is shaped by our environment—
even by details that may at first seem small. Id. (quoting MALCOLM GLADWELL, THE TIPPING 
POINT 141 (2000)). 
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These visible environmental details shape behavior.5 Just as one would expect 
that if a mugging occurs, it does so in a graffiti-filled subway tunnel or similar 
locale, one would expect that when crime occurs, it does so in a depressed 
neighborhood full of vacant, dilapidated houses.6 Not only is such a 
neighborhood a convenient site for hosting criminal activity, but the vacant 
houses also tell everyone that the neighborhood is the type of place where 
criminal activity is expected.7 As people in a neighborhood see that 
dilapidation and crime are expected, neighborhoods decline in a vicious cycle.8 
This problem is compounded by the reduction of the tax base that necessarily 
follows when homeowners are forced out of their homes.9 Cities face a two-
pronged attack—they have more problems to solve and less money with which 
to solve them. 
In its exploration of Richmond, California’s plan to use eminent domain to 
take mortgages that are underwater (the “Richmond Plan”), this article 
discusses the factors leading to, and the potential consequences following, the 
Richmond Plan.10 Following this introduction, Part II gives a brief background 
of eminent domain. Part III of this article discusses the factors leading to the 
burst of the housing bubble and examines the way in which it contributed to 
large numbers of foreclosures across the country, especially in Richmond. Part 
IV of this article will outline Richmond’s plan to combat blight by working 
with Mortgage Resolution Partners, LLC (MRP) to use its eminent domain 
power to take approximately 600 houses that are underwater. In Part V, this 
article outlines the current status of the Richmond Plan. Next, Section VI 
analyzes the constitutionality of the Richmond Plan, focusing specifically on 
the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. While this article briefly touches 
upon other potential constitutional challenges to the plan, the article’s main 
focus is the Takings Clause. This article posits that despite the Supreme 
Court’s deference to the legislature, the Richmond Plan may have some real 
 
 5. Id. (citing MALCOLM GLADWELL, THE TIPPING POINT 142–50 (2000)). 
 6. Id. at 212–13. 
 7. Id. 
 8. See id. 
 9. Samsa, supra note 1, at 191; see also MORTG. RESOLUTION PARTNERS, 
HOMEOWNERSHIP PROTECTION PROGRAM: A SOLUTION TO A CRITICAL PROBLEM 6 [hereinafter 
MRP] (“Consider, for example, a home that was purchased for $400,000 with a $360,000 
mortgage and has a current tax assessment of the purchase price. If that home sells in foreclosure 
for $200,000, its tax assessment is reset and can only increase by a small amount each year in 
many communities.”). 
 10. The city of Richmond, California, led by Mayor Gayle McLaughlin, is still planning to 
move forward with the use of eminent domain to take mortgages that are currently underwater. At 
least four other cities that considered using eminent domain to take underwater mortgages have 
backed down, deciding that it is too risky. Shaila Dewan, Eminent Domain: A Long Shot Against 
Blight, N. Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/12/business/in-richmond-
california-a-long-shot-against-blight.html. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
184 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXIV:181 
issues with the Takings Clause. In Part VII, this article urges that while the 
plan is creative and well intentioned, it will ultimately cause more harm than 
good. Not only is the legality of Richmond’s action questionable, but it also 
threatens to have just the effect it is meant to solve; it will give a significant 
windfall to a private company and to individual Richmond homeowners who 
may have taken out too risky of loans, while ultimately hurting the often 
working-class individuals who have invested in residential mortgage-backed 
security (RMBS) trusts and the people of Richmond who will likely have a 
difficult time procuring future financing.11 The Richmond plan could cause a 
snowball effect, allowing cities to intervene to break any number of private 
contracts, further hurting private investors and turning the mortgage industry 
on its head. Especially at a time when the industry is recovering, this simply 
does not make sense. 
II.  EMINENT DOMAIN 
Before undertaking an analysis of the Richmond Plan, it is necessary to 
outline the basics of eminent domain. Eminent domain comes from the 
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment12 and applies to state governments 
through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.13 An attribute 
of governmental power or sovereignty, eminent domain is a process whereby 
the government is allowed to compel a transfer of property rights in return for 
just compensation.14 For example, if the government wants to build a highway 
that must run in a relatively straight line, the government may use eminent 
domain to take the requisite property from the property owners who are 
unwilling to sell their land.15 
In order to be constitutional, however, exercises of eminent domain must 
satisfy both statutory and constitutional requirements.16 Specifically, eminent 
 
 11. In 2008, John McCain suggested using federal bailout money to buy troubled mortgages 
and write them down. However, this plan failed because the rules governing many of these pools 
forbade the trustee, or investor’s representative, from selling or modifying the mortgages unless 
they were already in default, even if sale or modification would be in the investors’ interests. Id. 
 12. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use without just 
compensation.”). 
 13. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 239 (1897) (“The 
conclusion of the court on this question is, that since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment 
compensation for private property taken for public use constitutes an essential element in ‘due 
process of law,’ and that without such compensation the appropriation of private property to 
public uses, no matter under what form of procedure it is taken, would violate the provisions of 
the Federal Constitution.”). 
 14. THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 1220 
(2d ed. 2012). 
 15. See id. 
 16. Id. at 1221. 
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domain may only be deployed for a “public use,”17 and the government must 
pay “just compensation” for the property.18 However, these terms can be 
difficult to interpret. Initially, state courts held that “public use” meant that the 
property had to be taken for “use by the public.”19 Yet the Supreme Court only 
requires that the property be used for the public advantage or benefit and has 
given great deference to the legislature in determining whether a taking 
satisfies the “public use” requirement.20 Just as the meaning of “public use” is 
not intuitive, “just compensation”21 can be difficult to define.22 Since eminent 
domain is typically used when negotiations for a market transaction break 
down, “fair market value” becomes a hypothetical guess about what the 
property should have received if transfer of the property had been voluntary.23 
However, the formula used by the courts does not take into account factors 
such as subjective value; as a result, it cannot be an exact figure.24 
Having discussed the basics of eminent domain, this article will now 
explore the factors leading toward Richmond, California’s novel plan to use its 
eminent domain power to take mortgages that are underwater. 
III.  CITIES IN DISTRESS 
The first step in understanding the Richmond Plan is to explore the factors 
contributing to the plan’s birth by examining the expansion and burst of the 
housing bubble, and then by specifically zeroing in on Richmond’s situation. 
The vicious cycle of foreclosure and neighborhood decline began in cities 
across the United States with the burst of the housing bubble25 and the great 
recession.26 Large numbers of homeowners who invested in houses they could 
barely afford when the market was at its peak are now underwater on 
 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. at 1245. 
 19. “Use by the public” meant that property could be taken for highways, parks, railroads, 
etc., that would be used by the public, but not for a private home or factory. Id. at 1221 (citing 
Philip Nichols, Jr., The Meaning of Public Use in the Law of Eminent Domain, 20 B.U. L. REV. 
615, 633 (1940)). 
 20. MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 14, at 1221–22. 
 21. See United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369 (1943), and MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 14, 
at 1250–54, for further discussion of “just compensation.” 
 22. MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 14, at 1245–46. 
 23. Id. at 1250. 
 24. See id. at 1252–53. See generally Brian Angelo Lee, Just Undercompensation: The 
Idiosyncratic Premium in Eminent Domain, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 593 (2013). 
 25. DEAN BAKER, CTR. FOR ECON. & POLICY RESEARCH , THE HOUSING BUBBLE FACT 
SHEET 3 (2005), available at http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/housing_fact_2005_ 
07.pdf. 
 26. See M. Hampton Foushee, Eminent Domain, Mortgage Backed Securities, and the Limits 
of the Takings Clause, 8 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 66, 69–70 (2013). 
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mortgages,27 meaning that they owe more—sometimes significantly more—
than the homes are currently worth.28 Faced with this dilemma, many 
homeowners will default on their mortgage payments, either out of necessity or 
because of a cost-benefit analysis.29 These defaults subject the homes to 
foreclosure or abandonment and have had the effect of decimating 
neighborhoods.30 The decimation has plagued cities, not only increasing the 
crime, blight, and transience, but also reducing the tax base, making it more 
difficult for cities to take action to fix the problem.31 In Irvington, New Jersey, 
for example, the city has spent $14 million in response to various hazards 
related to vacant homes, all the while struggling with dropping property 
values.32 As cities struggle, they have looked high and low for solutions. 
One such city is Richmond, California, a city near San Francisco that was 
hit hard by the burst of the housing bubble.33 Following the burst, Richmond’s 
mayor, Gayle McLaughlin, began working with MRP on a novel program.34 
The city plans to use eminent domain to take mortgages that are underwater 
and refinance them, hopefully creating more manageable monthly payments. 
This would allow homeowners to remain in their homes, help to stabilize the 
community, and lead Richmond out of the great recession, though it has yet to 
move forward implementing this creative solution.35 This plan has been the 
subject of harsh criticism and staunch opposition from many, including banks, 
the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), the Securities Industry and 
Financial Markets Association (SIFMA), and even a Richmond realtors’ 
 
 27. An underwater mortgage is an outstanding mortgage on which the homeowner debtor 
owes more on the mortgage than the market value of the house. For example, the Smiths might 
have purchased a home in 2006, when the home was worth $400,000. The Smiths currently owe 
$360,000 on their home; however, due to the burst of the housing bubble, this home is now worth 
only $260,000. Thus, the Smiths are $100,000 underwater on their investment. See America’s 
Housing Market: Not waving but drowning, ECONOMIST, Jan. 4, 2014, http://www.economist. 
com/news/finance-and-economics/21592644-radical-plan-help-underwater-homeowners-makes-
comeback-not-waving [hereinafter ECONOMIST]. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Roger Lowenstein, Walk Away From Your Mortgage!, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/10/magazine/10FOB-wwln-t.html?_r=0. 
 30. See Kelly, supra note 3, at 212–13. 
 31. Samsa, supra note 1, at 191. 
 32. Joe Tyrrell, NJ Town Turns to Eminent Domain to Clean Up Blight of Foreclosed 
Houses, NJ  SPOTLIGHT, Nov. 20, 2013, http://www.njspotlight.com/stories/13/11/19/nj-town-
turns-to-eminent-domain-to-clean-up-blight-of-foreclosed-houses/?p=all. 
 33. Dewan, supra note 10. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. Because Richmond has not yet taken action toward seizing mortgages, mortgage-
bond trustees have dismissed their lawsuits due to lack of ripeness until or unless Richmond 
chooses to use its eminent domain power to take mortgages. Sam Forgione, Investors withdraw 
appeals against eminent domain plan, REUTERS, May 16, 2014, available at http://www.reuters. 
com/article/2014/05/17/us-mortgages-investing-eminentdomain-idUSBREA4G00A20140517. 
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association.36 In the legal battle that has ensued, many are left wondering what 
the implications of this novel plan will be if it succeeds.37 
A. The Housing Bubble Burst 
In order to understand the challenges Richmond is facing, it is vital to 
consider the burst of the housing bubble. From 1950 to 1995, house prices 
grew at the same rate as other goods and services after adjusting for inflation—
the normal and sustainable pattern for market growth.38 However, after 1996, 
house prices began rising substantially—growing 45% after adjusting for 
inflation.39 In fact, in 2005, housing construction constituted approximately 5% 
of GDP,40 and each week roughly 140,000 families purchased a home.41 Some 
regions saw an increase in home prices of 60%.42 Generally, when prices in an 
industry rise, it is because of growth in population or income, or because of 
other natural factors.43 Yet during this particular period of growth, there was 
no substantial rise in either population or in income to explain the huge 
increase in the market.44 Significantly, as the housing market increased, the 
rental market remained relatively steady, which is unique because home prices 
and rental prices typically increase or decrease at a similar rate.45 The increase 
in the housing market was especially high on the East and Pacific coasts.46 
While it is not surprising that houses on the coasts would be more expensive 
than houses in other regions, there is still a limit to how much people will pay 
to live in these areas.47 In situations such as this, the economies are eventually 
unable to function until housing prices are reduced to a competitive price. 
At the same time house prices were rising, the ratio of home equity to 
home value plummeted, reaching a near record low in 2005.48 In June of 2006, 
US residential housing prices were at their peak,49 and buyers, who had 
become accustomed to a strong market and the idea of home ownership as an 
investment, borrowed blindly due to the high equity offered by the homes.50 
 
 36. Dewan, supra note 10. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Baker, supra note 25, at 1. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 3. 
 41. Id. at 4. 
 42. Id. at 5. 
 43. Id. at 1. 
 44. Baker, supra note 25, at 1. 
 45. Id. at 2. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 3. 
 49. MRP, supra note 9, at 3. 
 50. See Baker, supra note 25, at 3. 
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Yet these buyers bought homes they could barely afford.51 Unfortunately, this 
meant that when homes began to lose value, many homeowners owed more on 
their mortgages than their homes were worth.52 The same homeowners were 
left with either no choice but to default because of the strained economy or a 
strong incentive to default.53 
Defaults ultimately result in large numbers of foreclosures, and the large 
numbers of foreclosures can result in vacant and abandoned houses.54 From 
2000 to 2010, the number of vacant housing units increased by 4.5 million, or 
44%.55 Most of the losses have occurred in older industrial cities that have lost 
jobs and population over the past several years.56 In fact, more than half of the 
twenty cities that were the largest in 1950 have lost at least one-third of their 
populations.57 
Yet these defaults, which have been so hard on homeowners and cities, 
have been hard on mortgage holders as well.58 While banks hold a large 
amount of mortgage debt, mortgage-backed securities, a market that exceeded 
$6 trillion in 2005, hold most of the mortgages.59 Mortgage-backed securities 
include local pension plans, 401(k) plans, college savings plans, insurance 
companies, mutual funds, university endowments, and government-sponsored 
enterprises.60 
B. The Richmond Problem 
Foreclosures and abandonment hit many cities hard, propelling them to 
take action. One such city is Richmond, a refinery town with a population of 
 
 51. Tamara E. Holmes, 5 Lessons from the Housing-Bubble Bust, MSN REAL ESTATE, 
http://realestate.msn.com/article.aspx?cp-documentid=23468447 (last visited Sept. 21, 2014). 
 52. Baker, supra note 25, at 3. 
 53. Id. at 4. 
 54. See Samsa, supra note 1, at 191. 
 55. ALLAN MALLACH, BROOKINGS METROPOLITAN POLICY PROGRAM, LAYING THE 
GROUNDWORK FOR CHANGE: DEMOLITION, URBAN STRATEGY, AND POLICY REFORM 3 (2012). 
 56. Id. 
 57. Timothy Williams, Blighted Cities Prefer Razing to Rebuilding, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 
2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/12/us/blighted-cities-prefer-razing-to-rebuilding.html?_r 
=0. 
 58. Baker, supra note 25, at 4. 
 59. Baker, supra note 25, at 4; see also Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 
26, Wells Fargo Bank et al. v. City of Richmond, Cal. et al., No. C 13-03663 CRB (N.D. Cal. 
Aug. 7, 2013) [hereinafter Complaint] (explaining that many mortgage backed securities are held 
in RMBS trusts. An RMBS trust is an investment vehicle whereby financial and economic risks 
are distributed by pooling mortgage loans and issuing securities or certificates for which the 
mortgages serve as a collateral). 
 60. Complaint, supra note 59, at 9, 16. 
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approximately 106,000.61 Though the city was a shipbuilding center during 
World War II, it now has a poverty rate of 17%—a figure that is 3% higher 
than the California average.62 Roughly 38% of Richmond homeowners—more 
than 7,000 people—are underwater on their mortgages,63 compared with 19% 
nationally.64 In just three years, 2,000 of Richmond’s homes have gone into 
foreclosure.65 The issue, however, is not constrained to Richmond.66 
Nationwide, 23% of those with home loans owed at least 25% more than their 
property is worth, and 7.1 million homes with mortgages were underwater at 
the end of the second quarter of 2013.67 The consequences of these underwater 
mortgages become significant when homeowners are unable to continue 
making payments and the owners default on their loan obligations.68 
While foreclosure can be devastating to individual homeowners, its costs 
are shared by the community.69 As discussed above, some of the challenges 
associated with foreclosure and abandonment include neighborhood blight, 
transience, and an unkempt appearance.70 Homeowners will sometimes gut and 
abandon their homes, leading to squatters and crime.71 When one home in a 
city neighborhood becomes dilapidated or vacant, the people living in 
neighboring homes are left to deal with the consequences of the appearance of 
the unkempt home and the potential for illegal activity.72 With small lot sizes 
and densely populated city neighborhoods, the value of each home is tied to 
that of the others in the neighborhood.73 As homes lose value, owners may no 
longer choose to invest in them because the return on capital improvements is 
 
 61. Michael B. Marois, Richmond, California, May Abandon Plan to Seize Mortgages, 
BLOOMBERG, Sept. 7, 2013, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-09-07/richmond-california-
may-abandon-plan-to-seize-mortgages.html; see also U.S. Census Bureau, Richmond (city), 
California: State & County QuickFacts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/ 
states/06/0660620.html (last revised Dec. 4, 2014). 
 62. Alison Vekshin, Richmond, California, Advances Mortgage Reduction Plan, 
BLOOMBERG, Sept. 11, 2013, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-09-11/richmond-california-
advances-mortgage-reduction-plan.html. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Dewan, supra note 10. 
 65. Lydia Depillis, Richmond’s Rules: Why One California Town is Keeping Wall Street Up 
at Night, WASH. POST, Oct. 5, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/ 
10/05/richmonds-rules-why-one-california-town-is-keeping-wall-street-up-at-night/. 
 66. See Vekshin, supra note 62. 
 67. Vekshin, supra note 62. 
 68. MRP, supra note 9, at 5. 
 69. See Samsa, supra note 1, at 191. 
 70. MRP, supra note 9, at 5. 
 71. Simeone Foxman, Eminent Domain: This City’s Plan to Expropriate Mortgages Aims to 
Make Wall St Pay for the Housing Bubble, QUARTZ, Aug. 8 2013, http://qz.com/113250/this-cit 
ys-plan-to-expropriate-mortgages-could-make-wall-st-pay-for-the-housing-bubble/. 
 72. Kelly, supra note 3, at 212. 
 73. Id. 
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too low.74 As the neighborhoods decline, investors may forego making 
investments in the area.75 It becomes a vicious cycle. Though banks, which 
often become owners of properties after foreclosure, are required to take care 
of the homes and keep them up to code, they have not always followed 
through, as is apparent in Richmond.76 With so many homes in foreclosure, 
Richmond began fining banks $1,000 a day if they failed to maintain the 
properties.77 To date, the city has collected approximately $1.5 million from 
the banks.78 Further, a city’s tax base moves out with the homeowners, 
draining municipal resources and making it more difficult to care for the newly 
dilapidated neighborhoods.79 When this snowball begins to roll, it becomes 
difficult for cities to redevelop these neighborhoods.80 Richmond believes that 
nearly half of the private mortgages in Richmond will go into foreclosure.81 
This could cost Richmond $25 million.82 
Banks have given some mortgage relief, but according to McLaughlin, 
most of this relief has come in the form of short sales, which means that 
families are still losing homes and neighborhoods are losing stability.83 Banks 
are limited in the relief they can give because the mortgages are generally sold 
to investors as mortgage-backed securities or RMBS trusts.  McLaughlin 
claims that even when the banks have modified loans, the modifications are not 
enough to solve the problem.84 
While lenders must attempt to negotiate modifications before foreclosing 
on homeowners under California law,85 these modifications may not always 
happen. In a letter to Bank of America, California representative George Miller 
wrote that more than 568,000 of borrowers who had been foreclosed upon had 
 
 74. Id. 
 75. See id. 
 76. See Dewan, supra note 10. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Samsa, supra note 1, at 191; See also MALCOM GLADWELL, THE TIPPING POINT 141 
(1st ed. 2002) (“If a window is broken and left unrepaired, people will conclude that no one cares 
and no one is in charge. Soon, more windows will be broken and the sense of anarchy will spread 
from the building to the street on which it faces, sending a signal that anything goes.”). “Gladwell 
goes on to illustrate how superficial, but highly visible details in our everyday environment shape 
our behavior. In a subway system overwhelmed by graffiti, muggings just seem natural; somehow 
both the perpetrator and the victim know this and act accordingly.” Kelly, supra note 3, at 212. 
 80. Samsa, supra note 1, at 191. 
 81. Complaint, supra note 59, at 11. 
 82. Id. at 24. 
 83. Laura Flanders, Meet the Mayor Who’s Using Eminent Domain to Fight Foreclosure, 
NATION, Nov. 20, 2013, http://www.thenation.com/article/177296/meet-mayor-whos-using-emi 
nent-domain-fight-foreclosure. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Complaint, supra note 59, at 24. 
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not been contacted by their mortgage servicer to modify their loans.86 In fact, 
there have been multiple lawsuits threatened and/or filed over banks’ failure to 
modify loans.87 For example, a prominent New York prosecutor plans to file a 
lawsuit against Wells Fargo over alleged violations of a $25 billion mortgage 
settlement.88 Similarly, the New York attorney general has threatened suit 
against both Bank of America and Wells Fargo, alleging that the banks have 
not lived up to a mortgage pact that required them to improve their interactions 
with borrowers needing loan modification.89 
Part of the difficulty with loan modification, however, occurs due to the 
structure of the trusts. Since the RMBS trusts are owned by many different 
investors, they became much more difficult to modify because any change 
required the signature of so many parties.90 While nearly one hundred of the 
targeted homes had received loan modification that included debt forgiveness 
as of January 2014, these modifications are not always sustainable.91 
All of these problems have forced Richmond’s city officials to take action 
“to stabilize neighborhoods, to fight blight, [and] to keep homeowners in their 
homes.”92 The city’s plan for action, however, has been controversial to say the 
least. 
IV.  THE PLAN 
In response to the prevalence of blight and foreclosures, Richmond has 
created the “Richmond CARES Program”93 and enlisted the help of the private 
financing company MRP.94 MRP is currently a privately owned, for-profit 
investment firm based in San Francisco.95 For its part, MRP will raise funds to 
finance the Richmond Plan, identify the mortgage loans to be acquired through 
eminent domain, and arrange for the refinancing of seized loans.96 It is worth 
noting that MRP has filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission and 
 
 86. Letter from George Miller to Mr. Brian Moynihan, President and Chief Exec. Officer, 
Bank of America Corp. (Sept. 10, 2013) (on file with author). 
 87. See Andrew R. Johnson, New York Plans Action on Alleged Mortgage Violations, WALL 
ST. J., Oct. 1, 2013, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014240527023036433045791098 
30928878264. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Depillis, supra note 65. 
 91. Dewan, supra note 10. 
 92. Carolyn Said, Richmond Pushes Forward with Eminent Domain Plan, SFGATE, Dec. 18, 
2013, http://www.sfgate.com/realestate/article/Richmond-pushes-forward-with-eminent-domain-
plan-5073950.php (quoting Gayle McLaughlin). 
 93. Flanders, supra note 83. 
 94. Dewan, supra note 10. 
 95. Complaint, supra note 59, at 16. 
 96. Id. at 9. 
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plans to become publicly owned.97 MRP has entered into discussion with 
multiple local governments about using eminent domain to seize residential 
mortgages, but Richmond is the first city that has decided to implement the 
plan, though it has not yet taken action.98 Eminent domain theoretically solves 
the problem caused by RMBS trusts’ joint-ownership of loans—the struggle to 
coordinate effectively to take action99—because the government action can 
facilitate the exchange without having to gather signatures from all trust 
owners.100 
Richmond and MRP plan to either purchase or use Richmond’s eminent 
domain power to seize approximately 624 homes that are underwater101 so they 
can “retake control over the welfare of their neighborhoods and their fiscal 
solvency.”102 Once an underwater loan is chosen, Richmond will purchase or 
seize the loan for roughly 80% of the home’s current value.103 The city will 
pay for this with money from MRP, which will then own the mortgage.104 
After securing the loan, Richmond will refinance the old loan and replace it 
with a new loan worth approximately 95% of the underlying home value,105 an 
amount that will be more manageable for homeowners.106 For example, if the 
Smiths are underwater on a home worth $200,000, Richmond will seize the 
mortgage using eminent domain, paying $160,000 to the trust, which is 80% of 
the value of the home.107 Richmond will then refinance the loan for $190,000, 
leaving a difference of $30,000.108 Richmond will receive 5% of this spread (in 
this case, $9,500).109 MRP will receive a flat fee of $4,500 for each seizure, 
and may receive further compensation if they arrange the refinancing of the 
mortgage.110 Investors of MRP will receive any money left over from the 
taking.111 Notably, Richmond and MRP are targeting loans that are current or 
 
 97. Mailing from West Contra Costa Association of REALTORS, Don’t Let Wall Street 
Take Another Bite Out of Richmond Homes [hereinafter Realtor Mailing] (on file with author). 
 98. Complaint, supra note 59, at 17. 
 99. Dewan, supra note 10. 
 100. Depillis, supra note 65. 
 101. During the summer of 2013, underwater homeowners owed an average of 45% more 
than the value of their homes. Dewan, supra note 10. 
 102. MRP, supra note 9, at 4. 
 103. Complaint, supra note 59, at 21. 
 104. Depillis, supra note 65. 
 105. Complaint, supra note 59, at 21. 
 106. Depillis, supra note 65. 
 107. See Complaint, supra note 59, at 21. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 22. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
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from borrowers who appear likely to repay their loans.112 This plan is the 
brainchild of three different professors—Robert Hockett of Cornell Law,113 
Lauren Willis of Loyola University, and Howell Jackson of Harvard—who 
came up with the plan simultaneously but independently.114 
MRP’s program is a response to real problems.115 The Federal Reserve 
Board cites three key forces at the root of these problems, resulting from 
within the housing market.116 First, there is a persistent excess supply of vacant 
homes on the market, several stemming from foreclosures.117 Second, there has 
been a significant downshift in the availability of mortgage credit, and there is 
no telling when this will turn around.118 Finally, foreclosure procedures are 
inefficient and impose great costs on homeowners, lenders, and 
communities.119 Richmond and MRP’s plan seeks to benefit both individual 
homeowners and the community as a whole.120 On the individual level, the 
partners seek to save homeowners money and preserve home ownership 
equity, allowing homeowners to remain in their homes.121 This will stabilize 
the broader community by reducing and preventing blight.122 Further, 
homeowners with reduced mortgage payments will be able to spend that 
money on local businesses, adding money to the local economy and 
stimulating community wealth.123 However, as already noted, the plan has been 
met with staunch resistance from several sources, including but not limited to 
mortgage holders, the FHFA, and a group of Richmond realtors.124 
 
 112. Under the MRP business model, a loan seizure will not be profitable unless the seized 
loan can be refinanced or the amount paid to compensate the RMBS trusts would be 
unreimbursed. Unless it targets performing homeowners with good credit ratings, MRP could 
have a difficult time selling the new loan to investors. MRP, supra note 9, at 19–20. 
 113. See Robert Hockett, It Takes a Village: Municipal Condemnation Proceedings and 
Public/Private Partnerships for Mortgage Loan Modification, Value Preservation, and Local 
Economic Recovery, 18 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 121, 149–57 (2012), for a more detailed 
discussion of the Richmond Plan. 
 114. Depillis, supra note 65. 
 115. Kelly F. Heudepohl, Comment, A Life Raft for Underwater Mortgages? Whether the 
Federal Constitution Permits State and Local Governments to Condemn Home Mortgage 
Contracts to Solve the Housing Crisis, 49 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 275, 281 (2012). 
 116. Jennifer Burnett, CSG Staff Speaks to KY Task Force on Foreclosures, CSG 
KNOWLEDGE CENTER, Dec. 6, 2012, http://knowledgecenter.csg.org/kc/content/csg-staff-speaks-
ky-task-force-foreclosures. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. See Complaint, supra note 59, at 54. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
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V.  THE LAWSUIT 
This resistance culminated in two lawsuits: one headed by Wells Fargo 
Bank and Deutsche Bank National Trust Company as trustees for hundreds of 
residential mortgage-backed trusts that hold the targeted mortgage loans,125 
and the other by Bank of New York Mellon, U.S. Bank, and Wilmington Trust 
Co.126 Though the district court in the former lawsuit dismissed the banks’ 
motion for a preliminary injunction,127 the banks have said they will continue 
their resistance against the city and MRP’s plan if eminent domain action is 
taken.128 Until and unless such action is taken, however, the banks have 
dismissed their lawsuit.129 
On September 16, 2013, United States District Judge for the Northern 
District of California Charles R. Breyer dismissed the banks’ claims because 
the claims were not yet ripe.130 Judge Breyer held that because the claims do 
not rest on contingent future events certain to occur, but rather rest on future 
events that may never occur, the plaintiffs did not have standing to bring 
suit.131 Until Richmond actually takes action and uses its eminent domain 
power to seize mortgages, it would appear that the courts will not step in.132 
Even within the city, there seems to be a lot of disagreement about whether 
the plan is the best course of action. At its first vote on the Richmond Plan in 
April of 2013, the city council voted unanimously in its favor.133 However, 
when McLaughlin attempted to move forward with the plan in September of 
2013, the Richmond Plan passed with just four of seven votes.134 According to 
Richmond realtor Jess Wright, “the underwater mortgage bailout program is on 
life support.”135 This internal dissent could explain why Richmond has not yet 
taken action and may signal that the banks will not need to file another lawsuit. 
 
 125. Id. 
 126. Phyllis Skupien, Quick Ruling Denied in Dispute over California Town’s Mortgage 
Seizure Plan, THOMSON REUTERS, Oct. 16, 2013, available at http://blog.thomsonreuters.com/in 
dex.php/quick-ruling-denied-in-dispute-over-california-towns-mortgage-seizure-plan/. 
 127. Depillis, supra note 65. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Forgione, supra note 35. 
 130. Dan Levine, Judge Dismisses Lawsuit Against Richmond, California Mortgage Plan, 
THOMSON REUTERS, Sept. 16, 2013, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/16/us-
usa-mortgages-ruling-idUSBRE98F12M20130 916. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Dewan, supra note 10. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
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A. The Stakes 
The stakes are high on both sides. If Richmond and MRP take eminent 
domain action and lose in court, the city could find itself in serious debt 
because it was unable to get insurance to shield itself from such a loss.136 This 
is especially pertinent because the city attempted to pass a $34 million bond 
issuance to refinance some of its earlier debt, but could not find investors for 
the bonds.137 MRP has already spent more than $7 million to promote its plan 
and pay legal fees.138 Yet the opponents’ stakes are also very high, especially 
because a victory for the Richmond Plan could encourage numerous other 
municipalities to follow suit, taking underwater mortgages even when they are 
performing.139 This could cost RMBS trusts billions of dollars.140 
B. Current Status 
Richmond has not taken action yet, likely due in part to a divide of opinion 
within the city council.141 Though three council members back McLaughlin, 
the vice mayor and two council members, who are concerned that the plan will 
subject Richmond to crushing legal liabilities that may not be covered by 
MRP, have met McLaughlin with opposition.142 In a letter, Councilman Nat 
Bates has called the plan “ill advised,” asserting that if the plan continues to 
move forward, he will push to take the issue to voters.143 
However, in a 4–2 vote on December 17, 2013, the Richmond City 
Council voted to set guidelines for using eminent domains to take mortgages in 
an effort to prevent foreclosures.144 While the council would currently need a 
five-vote supermajority to take action, Richmond does have the power to, with 
a majority vote, set up a joint powers authority that could unilaterally authorize 
eminent domain with its own supermajority vote.145 If the plan does move 
forward, council members have agreed to prioritize target locations by 
beginning the eminent domain plan in the neighborhoods that were hit hardest 
by the foreclosure crisis.146 If Richmond takes eminent domain action, the 
banks have pledged that their lawsuit will be “immediately re-filed.”147 
 
 136. Depillis, supra note 65. 
 137. Id. 
 138. See infra Part VII.C. 
 139. See infra Part VII.C. 
 140. See infra Part VII.C. 
 141. Said, supra note 92. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Forgione, supra note 35. 
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VI.  CONSTITUTIONALITY 
There has been much debate regarding whether Richmond’s proposed 
action is constitutional.148 This article focuses primarily on the Takings Clause, 
but gives a brief overview of some of the other constitutional arguments. The 
Supreme Court has set a precedent for the use of eminent domain under the 
Takings Clause in decisions such as Berman v. Parker,149 Hawaii Housing 
Authority v. Midkiff,150 and Kelo v. City of New London.151 Yet while Berman, 
Midkiff, and Kelo showed great deference to legislative judgment,152 forty-two 
states responded to the Kelo decision by enacting legislation or passing ballot 
measures to limit the circumstances under which the government could use its 
eminent domain power to take property when using economic development as 
a legitimate public purpose.153 Further, while Supreme Court precedents allow 
an expansive definition of “public use,” several lower court decisions in the 
twenty-first century invalidated the use of eminent domain as a means of 
acquiring real estate for particular entities.154 
It is important to note that though Berman, Midkiff, and Kelo dealt with the 
transfer of real property, courts have consistently permitted the seizure of 
intangible property under the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause.155 In fact, in 
 
 148. Use of Eminent Domain to Restructure Performing Loans, 77 Fed. Reg. 47,652 (Aug. 6, 
2012). See generally Complaint, supra note 59. 
 149. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954). 
 150. Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984). 
 151. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
 152. Id. at 487–88. 
 153. Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, Eminent Domain Overview, NCSL, 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/environment-and-natural-resources/eminent-domain-overview.aspx 
(last visited Dec. 1, 2014) (explaining that between 2005 and 2011, forty-two states enacted 
legislation or passed ballot measures in response to Kelo; these measures either restricted the use 
of eminent domain for economic development, defined “public use,” established additional 
criteria for designating blighted areas subject to eminent domain, strengthened public notice, 
public hearing, and landowner negotiation criteria, or required compensation at greater than fair 
market value). 
 154. MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 14, at 1222–23 (citing Sw. Ill. Dev. Auth. v. Nat’l City 
Envtl., L.L.C., 768 N.E.2d 1 (Ill. 2002) (invalidating condemnation of recycling center for 
retransfer to auto race track for use as a parking lot); 99 Cents Only Stores v. Lancaster 
Redevelopment Agency, 237 F. Supp. 2d 1123 (C.D. Cal. 2001), appeal dismissed as moot, 60 
Fed. App’x 123 (9th Cir. 2003) (invalidating condemnation of lease in shopping center for 
retransfer to another store for expansion); Casino Reinvestment Dev. Auth. v. Banin, 727 A.2d 
102 (N.J. Super. 1998) (invalidating condemnation of land for future expansion of a commercial 
casino); Wayne Cnty. v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004) (holding that property cannot 
be condemned and retransferred to a commercial entity when the sole rationale is economic 
development)). 
 155. Foushee, supra note 25, at 77; see, e.g., Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co. v. United States, 
274 U.S. 215, 220 (1927) (tobacco contracts); In re Fifth Ave. Coach Lines, Inc., 18 N.Y.2d 212, 
221 (1966) (bus operating routes and schedules); City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 31 Cal. 3d 
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its City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders decision, the California Supreme Court 
held that the right of eminent domain encompasses property of every kind.156 
A. The Takings Clause 
As noted above, one of the major criticisms of the Richmond Plan is that it 
violates the Takings Clause of the United States Constitution.157 Implicated by 
the Takings Clause are the requirements that for a municipality or 
governmental body to take private property, the taking must be “rationally 
related to a conceivable public purpose”158 and the government must pay “just 
compensation” for the property.159 
1. Public Purpose 
In order to analyze the Richmond Plan in terms of “public purpose,” it is 
important to look at the relevant United States Supreme Court precedents, the 
first of which is Berman v. Parker. In Berman, the Supreme Court upheld the 
use of eminent domain where the District of Columbia attempted to take all 
rights to the land located in a particular area for the purpose of redeveloping a 
blighted area.160 Though not all of the property taken by the District of 
Columbia was blighted161 and some of the property taken was given to private 
parties,162 the use of eminent domain was held to be lawful. First, the Court 
stated that the police power is broad and the role of the judiciary in 
determining whether that power is being properly used is extremely narrow.163 
Next, the Court held that “public purpose” is a broad concept and the 
revitalization of blighted communities is a recognized public purpose.164 The 
 
656, 668 (1982) (a sports franchise); Porter v. United States, 473 F.2d 1329, 1333–35 (5th Cir. 
1973) (the right to exploit the collector’s value of Lee Harvey Oswald’s personal effects). 
 156. City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 31 Cal. 3d. 656 (1982). 
 157. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation”); CAL. CONST. art. I, § 19 (providing that private property may be taken only for a 
“public use”). 
 158. Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1984). 
 159. Id. 
 160. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 28 (1954). 
 161. The appellants in Berman owned a department store and claimed that their property 
could not be taken because it was commercial, was itself blighted, and would be given to a private 
rather than public agency for redevelopment to serve a private rather than public use. Id. at 31. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. at 32 (“An attempt to define its reach or trace its outer limits is fruitless, for each case 
must turn on its own facts . . . . Subject to specific constitutional limitations, when the legislature 
has spoken, the public interest has been declared in terms well-nigh conclusive.”). 
 164. Id. at 33 (“The concept of public welfare is broad and inclusive . . . . The values it 
represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary . . . . If those who govern 
the District of Columbia decide that the Nation’s Capital should be beautiful as well as sanitary, 
there is nothing in the fifth amendment that stands in the way.”). 
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Court made clear that as soon as a public purpose is established, eminent 
domain is a means to an end and allows transfer of property from one private 
party to other private parties as part of a comprehensive redevelopment plan.165 
After all, the public end may be equally as or better served by a private 
enterprise than a public agency, and the legislature is in a better position than 
the court to make this determination.166 Finally, the Court held that eminent 
domain need not be used on a structure-by-structure basis, but instead may be 
used on an entire area, even when not all of the buildings are blighted.167 
Thirty years later, the Supreme Court again analyzed “public purpose” in 
the landmark case Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff. In Midkiff, the Court 
was asked to determine whether the Hawaii Housing Authority could exercise 
eminent domain to take property from large private landholders and distribute 
it among private parties in order to break up a land oligopoly, which began 
when Hawaii was first settled.168 Again deferring to the legislature, the Court 
held that where the exercise of eminent domain power is rationally related to a 
conceivable public purpose, eminent domain is allowed even if it ultimately 
results in transfer of property from one private party to another.169 Condemned 
property need not be put into use for the general public, and the mere fact that 
property taken by eminent domain is transferred immediately to private 
beneficiaries does not mean that the taking has only a private purpose.170 The 
Court, stating that regulating an oligopoly and the evils associated with it is a 
classic exercise of a state’s police power, held that Hawaii’s approach was 
comprehensive and rational.171 Finally, the Court held that whether the 
provision actually accomplished the objectives it sought to achieve was 
 
 165. Id. (“For the power of eminent domain is merely the means to the end.”). 
 166. Berman, 348 U.S. at 33–34 (“But the means of executing the project are for Congress 
and Congress alone to determine, once the public purpose has been established . . . . We cannot 
say that public ownership is the sole method of promoting the public purposes of community 
redevelopment projects.”). 
 167. Id. at 34. 
 168. When Polynesian immigrants settled the Hawaiian Islands, the settlers developed a 
feudal land tenure system where the island high chief controlled all land and assigned it to 
subchiefs for development. All land was eventually returned to the trust of the high chief; thus 
there was no private ownership of land. Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 231 
(1984). 
 169. Id. at 241. 
 170. Id. at 243–44. 
 171. Id. at 241–42 (“The people of Hawaii have attempted, much as the settlers of the original 
13 Colonies did, to reduce the perceived social and economic evils of a land oligopoly . . . . [That 
has] created artificial deterrents to the normal functioning of the State’s residential land market 
and forced thousands of individual homeowners to lease, rather than buy, the land underneath 
their homes.”). 
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irrelevant.172 In order to meet constitutional requirements, the legislature 
simply must rationally believe that the act would promote its objective.173 
The final case discussed in this section is Kelo v. City of New London, a 5–
4 Supreme Court decision involving a development plan that was projected to 
create jobs, increase tax and other revenues, and revitalize an economically 
distressed city.174 Though none of the petitioners’ properties were in a blighted 
or poor condition,175 the city’s use of eminent domain satisfied the “public use” 
requirement of the Fifth Amendment as part of a comprehensive economic 
development plan.176 Citing Berman and Midkiff heavily,177 the Court, not 
surprisingly, deferred to the legislature,178 noting the comprehensive character 
of the plan, the thorough deliberation that preceded its adoption, the limited 
scope of the court’s review, and the broad understanding of public purpose.179 
Further, the Court rejected the contention that this was a one-to-one transfer of 
property from citizen A to citizen B outside the confines of an integrated 
plan.180 The pursuit of a public purpose may benefit individual private parties, 
and this is allowed as long as it is part of a comprehensive economic 
development plan.181  Finally, the Court rejected the argument that takings for 
purely economic purposes should require “reasonable certainty” that the 
expected public benefits would actually accrue.182 When the legislature’s 
purpose is legitimate and its means are not irrational, the wisdom of such 
takings is not to be debated.183 
Kelo and other precedents provide strong support that eminent domain may 
be properly used for economic development, increasing the tax base, and 
 
 172. Id. at 242. 
 173. Id. 
 174. The city of New London, which had an unemployment rate nearly double that of the 
state and a population at its lowest since 1920, was considered a “distressed municipality” by a 
state agency. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 472 (2005). The development plan 
sought to build commercial buildings, a pedestrian riverwalk, residences, a public walkway, a 
museum, a state park, and office space, among other things. Id. at 474. 
 175. Id. at 475. 
 176. See id. at 469. 
 177. The Court also cited Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984), a case dealing 
with provisions of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act under which the 
Environmental Protection Agency could consider data (including trade secrets) submitted by a 
prior pesticide applicant in evaluating a subsequent application so long as the second applicant 
paid just compensation for the data. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 469. 
 178. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 482 (“Our earliest cases in particular embodied a strong theme of 
federalism, emphasizing the ‘great respect’ that we owe to state legislatures and state courts in 
discerning local public needs.”). 
 179. Id. at 484. 
 180. Id. at 487. 
 181. Id. at 485. 
 182. Id. at 487–88. 
 183. Id. at 488. 
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combating blight—the very ends the Richmond Plan is designed to achieve.184 
Further, simply because a private party benefits from the government’s pursuit 
of a public purpose does not mean that a transfer is improper.185 The reasoning 
behind this is that public ownership is not necessarily the only, nor the best, 
way to serve a public end.186 Yet it is important to note that the circumstances 
surrounding Kelo and the Richmond Plan are different. In Kelo, the City of 
New London planned a comprehensive redevelopment project, which included 
a number of new buildings and parks aimed at improving the city’s economic 
condition, recreational space, and aesthetic appeal.187 In contrast, the 
Richmond Plan aims solely to transfer mortgages from one group of investors 
to another, leaving homeowners in place and casting doubt as to whether this 
can truly constitute a “comprehensive redevelopment project” aimed at serving 
a public purpose.188 The Richmond Plan, then, may better be likened to 
Midkiff, where the Hawaii Housing Authority took large plots of land from 
private parties and distributed those plots among other private parties in order 
to break up a land oligopoly, which began when Hawaii was first settled189 and 
“created artificial deterrents to the normal functioning of the State’s residential 
land market.”190 Richmond, then, may be able to make a plausible argument 
that the purpose of the Richmond Plan is to take and redistribute unjust 
mortgages that deter the normal functioning of Richmond’s residential land 
market.191 If the court is able to see a parallel between these “public use” 
arguments, Richmond will succeed on this point. Still, where the police power 
is difficult to define and each case must turn on its own facts, it is difficult to 
determine how a court will rule.192 
While combating blight seems to clearly be a “public purpose,” Richmond 
may have a difficult time explaining that its action is “reasonably related” to 
such public purpose. This is because loan modifications are not necessarily 
correlated to the likelihood that a homeowner will default,193 meaning that the 
Richmond Plan may not actually do anything to prevent blight, crime, 
 
 184. See Kelo, 545 U.S at 483–84. 
 185. Id. at 485. 
 186. Id. at 486 (“The public end may be as well or better served through an agency of private 
enterprise than through a department government—or so the Congress might conclude.”). 
 187. See Foushee, supra note 26, at 93–94 (explaining that the comprehensive redevelopment 
project included a waterfront conference hotel, marinas, a pedestrian riverwalk, a Coast Guard 
museum, a state park, and 90,000 square feet of office space). 
 188. See id. at 94. 
 189. Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 231 (1984). 
 190. Id. at 242. 
 191. See id. 
 192. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954) (“The definition [of police power] is 
essentially the product of legislative determinations addressed to the purposes of government, 
purposes neither abstractly nor historically capable of complete definition.”). 
 193. Foushee, supra note 26, at 85. 
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transience, or the reduction of the tax base. In its 2012 Review of Options 
Available for Underwater Borrowers and Principal Forgiveness, the FHFA 
found that a borrower’s post-modification loan-to-value ratio has little effect 
on whether the borrower will continue to perform on the loan.194 Among 
homeowners who received loan modifications, those with a post-modification 
loan-to-value ratio of 80% were only 2% more likely to stay current and 
perform on their loan than homeowners with a post-modification loan-to-value 
ratio of 190%.195 It follows, then, that even if MRP is able to refinance the 
mortgages, the loan modification may not have much effect on halting 
foreclosure. However, the Kelo majority rejected the requirement that there be 
“reasonable certainty” that the expected public benefits would actually accrue, 
instead holding that “if a legislature’s purpose is legitimate and its means are 
not irrational,” courts should not delve into the wisdom of takings.196 
Even if one does not consider the wisdom of the Richmond Plan, Kelo 
makes clear that a city may not take property under the pretext of a public 
purpose when its actual goal is to confer a private benefit, nor may a city adopt 
a development plan in order to benefit a particular class of identifiable 
individuals.197 The Court in Kelo asserts that a one-to-one transfer of property, 
executed outside the confines of an integrated development plan, “would 
certainly raise a suspicion that a private purpose was afoot.”198 Justice 
Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Kelo discusses factors that should be 
considered in determining whether there is a plausible accusation of 
impermissible favoritism to private parties.199 Though at least one of these 
 
 194. Id. (citing FED. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY, REVIEW OF OPTIONS AVAILABLE FOR 
UNDERWATER BORROWERS AND PRINCIPAL FORGIVENESS (July 31, 2012), available at 
http://www.fhfa.gov/PolicyProgramsResearch/Research/Pages/Review-of-Options-Available-for-
Underwater-Borrowers-and-Principal-Forgiveness.aspx). 
 195. Foushee, supra note 26, at 85 (“A homeowner with a post-modification LTV of 80 
percent or less had a 72 percent likelihood of remaining current and performing on his loans for 
the first 12 months after modification, while a homeowner with a post-modification LTV of 190 
percent or higher had a 70 percent likelihood of staying current and performing during that same 
period.”). 
 196. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 488 (2005). 
 197. Id. at 478 (“Nor would the City be allowed to take property under the mere pretext of a 
public purpose, when its actual purpose was to bestow a private benefit. The takings before us, 
however, would be executed pursuant to a ‘carefully considered’ development plan . . . . 
Therefore, as was true of the statute challenged in Midkiff, the City’s development plan was not 
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 198. Id. at 487. 
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factors was met— Richmond is facing depressed economic conditions, and this 
can be corroborated with evidence200—others are called into question. For 
example, did Richmond commit substantial public funds before the private 
beneficiaries were known?201 Did the city review a variety of development 
plans?202 Was MRP chosen from a group of applicants before Richmond 
decided upon using eminent domain?203 While the answers to these questions 
are somewhat unclear, it is likely MRP and Richmond worked on the plan 
together.204 In fact, McLaughlin began considering the idea after hearing about 
it from MRP and the Alliance of Californians for Community 
Empowerment.205 Further, unlike in Kelo, where several projects benefitting 
several private parties were part of the economic development plan,206 the 
Richmond Plan will solely benefit MRP and the homeowners whose mortgages 
are refinanced.207 In their complaint, the banks went so far as to say that the 
Richmond Plan is a seizure of property from one private party to another 
private party, with “Richmond receiving a small cut of the profits as its fee for 
renting out its eminent domain powers.”208 Finally, Richmond’s plan 
specifically targets mortgages held by private-label RMBS trusts as opposed to 
those held by trusts sponsored and guaranteed by Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac, or those held directly by banks.209 One must wonder why, if the 
Richmond Plan’s true purpose is keeping Richmond citizens in their homes in 
order to prevent crime, blight, transience, and so forth, the plan does not target 
all underwater mortgages.210 However, it may be that instead, Richmond is 
targeting loans held by RMBS trusts because they are particularly difficult to 
modify211 and thus require eminent domain. This argument directs our 
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attention back to the Midkiff analysis. In Midkiff, the public purpose was 
reducing the perceived social and economic evils of a land oligopoly, which 
created artificial deterrents to the normal functioning of the state’s residential 
land market.212 In Richmond, the public purpose may be reducing the 
perceived social and economic evils of unjust mortgage rates, which do not 
allow homeowners to remain in their homes and thus decimate neighborhoods. 
2. Just Compensation 
Beyond issues with the public use requirement, there are some major 
concerns about whether Richmond will provide homeowners with “just 
compensation” for the takings. The Fifth Amendment’s “just compensation” 
requirement means that in order to be a constitutional taking, cities must pay 
an amount equal to the property’s fair market value, or the price that would be 
agreed upon by a willing seller and a willing buyer.213 The Supreme Court 
defined “just compensation” as the “full and perfect equivalent in money of the 
property taken” when the property is seized.214 However, this is an issue of 
first impression—courts have never determined what just compensation means 
in relation to the seizure of mortgages.215 
While courts have not considered mortgage seizures specifically, courts 
have considered the rights of secured creditors in other settings. In Louisville 
Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, the Supreme Court examined the 
constitutionality of the Frazier-Lemke Amendment (the “Amendment”) to the 
Bankruptcy Act, which prevented distribution of a person’s property despite 
default.216 According to the Amendment, a debtor who filed for bankruptcy 
was entitled to a stay of all proceedings for five years while retaining 
possession of the property in question, as long as the debtor paid rent 
annually.217 The debtor had the right, at any time during or at the end of the 
five years, to request reappraisal of the real estate and pay the reappraised 
price.218 The Court held that a statute enacted for the relief of a mortgagor, 
when applied to a preexisting mortgage, would only be constitutional if it 
allowed the mortgagee to obtain substantial payment of the indebtedness.219 If 
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the right of the mortgagee is substantially abridged, the law must be stricken 
down.220 A modified version of the Amendment was addressed and ultimately 
upheld by the Supreme Court two years later in Wright v. Vinton Branch of the 
Mountain Trust Bank.221 Since the length of the stay was reduced and new 
protections were offered to farm creditors, the Court held that the creditor’s 
security interest was not substantially impaired by the act.222 Finally, in Wright 
v. Union Central Life Insurance Co., the Supreme Court asserted that a 
creditor’s constitutional rights were protected as long as there were safeguards 
in place to protect the right of secured creditors “to the extent of the value of 
the property.”223 As these cases show, a secured creditor has a constitutional 
right to seek the value of his or her property or collateral.224 
In this situation, however, Richmond and MRP do not plan to pay the 
value of the mortgages, but instead will only be paying 80% of the value of the 
home.225 MRP’s president, Steve Gluckstern, argues that the amount the 
company would pay for the mortgages is fair market value because it is equal 
to the value Fannie Mae assigned to its securities in financial filing disclosures, 
based on the amount of loans expected to default.226 Further, since creditors 
typically do not gain the full value of a home when a house is sold through 
foreclosure, MRP argues that the appraised value of the home is higher than 
the creditor could expect to recover.227 Notably, the difference between the 
amount paid by MRP and the current value of the mortgages could result in a 
return of up to 30% for MRP’s investors.228 
In order to accept MRP’s position, one would have to accept the 
assumption that each of the underwater homes would actually default on its 
loan and fall into foreclosure.229 However, this is highly unlikely. Richmond’s 
plan targets loans that are currently performing and have a low risk of 
default—it is the only way MRP’s plan will be financially feasible.230 In 
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Richmond, approximately 70% of the homes targeted are current on their 
payments,231 and simply because a home has lost value due to the downturn of 
the housing market does not mean that its owners will stop payments on the 
home.232 Further, the Richmond Plan disregards the money generated by the 
interest payments coming from performing mortgages.233 When a mortgage 
lender extends a loan of $125,000 at a 3.5% interest rate over a thirty-year 
period, the lender may expect that the loan will generate $77,070.10 in interest 
income during the period of the loan.234 This loss is not accounted for by 
MRP’s valuation. Thus, the loss to the holders of the RMBS trusts are twofold; 
they are paid 20% less than the value of the home and are immediately cut off 
from the cash flow generated by principal and interest repayments.235 
The Richmond Plan will have a difficult time surviving a Takings Clause 
challenge. Though Kelo and other precedent gave significant deference to the 
legislative branch in determining what constitutes public purpose, MRP and 
Richmond will have to overcome the argument that the Richmond Plan is 
intended to favor MRP with only incidental public benefits.236 Even if the 
Richmond Plan succeeds, it will have a difficult time constituting “just 
compensation,” as MRP will pay only 85% of the underlying value of the 
home though approximately 70% of the loans targeted are at low risk of default 
and the Richmond Plan fails to account for losses in interest payments.237 
B. Other Constitutional Arguments 
Beyond the Takings Clause, critics of the plan have made other 
constitutional arguments. The banks argue that in allowing citizens who do not 
live in Richmond to seize notes that are held outside of Richmond, the city’s 
use of eminent domain would violate California’s statutory prohibitions against 
extraterritorial seizures.238 Moreover, the banks believe that Richmond’s action 
would violate both the Contracts Clause, which prevents a local government 
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from abrogating debts of local residents held by creditors,239 and the dormant 
commerce clause doctrine, which prevents local governments from 
discriminating against out-of-state investors or erecting barriers to interstate 
commerce that benefit the state’s economy.240 The banks argue that in 
benefiting its local economy, Richmond’s action would come at the expense of 
an important sector of interstate commerce—the interstate market for 
mortgage-backed securities.241 This, in turn, will affect numerous Americans 
because this portion of the home loan industry enables people to buy homes.242 
The banks’ final constitutional argument is that Richmond’s action would 
violate the Equal Protection Clause because the proposed plan discriminates 
against both the mortgage holders and certain classes of Richmond 
homeowners without any legitimate purpose.243 
Like the banks, the FHFA cited the constitutionality of the use and the 
application of state and federal consumer laws as reasons for its opposition to 
the plan, as well as concerns about Richmond and other local governments’ 
valuations of complex contractual arrangements traded in both national and 
international markets.244 Jeff Wright, spokesman for a group of Richmond 
realtors speaking out against the plan, shares this concern about the 
government’s interference in private contracts.245 Wright does not want the 
government to break up a contract between a lender and homeowner to help 
someone who either should not have taken out a loan in the first place or who, 
though underwater on his or her mortgage, can and would continue 
performing.246 This, he argues, is part of the risk inherent in any investment.247 
Finally, the plan would impact millions of negotiated and performing mortgage 
contracts.248 In a city that is nearly two-thirds minority, the FHFA worries that 
Richmond’s plan will constitute redlining, cutting off credit to a 
disproportionate number of Hispanics and African Americans.249 
As is apparent from the discussion in this section, the Richmond Plan is 
rife with constitutional issues. Like many eminent domain actions, it will be 
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challenged heavily under the Takings Clause. Yet due to its unique nature as 
targeting intangible property owned by secured creditors across the country, 
the Richmond Plan is exposed to numerous other constitutional challenges. 
Even if the Richmond Plan is constitutional, however, it is likely not a good 
idea for more practical reasons. 
VII.  MORE HARM THAN GOOD 
Despite its creativity and best intentions, the Richmond Plan is simply not 
the wisest course of action at this point in time. Even if the Richmond Plan was 
able to survive a constitutional challenge, its implementation could result in 
significant consequences to the very people the plan aims to help. 
A. Who Owns the Mortgages? 
One of the first hurdles discussed after Richmond decided to move forward 
with the Richmond Plan was the fact that the mortgages Richmond plans to 
take through eminent domain are not actually owned by banks or by any one 
individual entity.250 In its response to Richmond’s offer to purchase the 
underwater mortgages, Wells Fargo’s assistant general counsel David Gorsche 
wrote that the bank’s understanding of the law is that even if it did think the 
plan made sense, the bank “does not have the contractual authority to sell the 
loans251 and is not aware of any other party having the contractual authority to 
sell the loans or consider [Richmond’s] offer.”252 This is because the 
mortgages are held by RMBS trusts.253 The beneficiaries for these trusts 
include state and local pension plans, 401(k) plans, college savings plans, 
insurance companies, mutual funds, university endowments, and government-
sponsored enterprises.254 There are a couple of problems with the fragmented 
ownership of the mortgages.255 If Richmond offers to purchase the mortgages, 
it will be immensely difficult to track down and negotiate with the specific 
owner(s) of each individual mortgage.256 If Richmond uses eminent domain to 
take the mortgages, it risks violating multiple constitutional and statutory 
provisions, which have already been discussed.257 
Beyond its inability to sell the loans, Richmond’s plan could cause 
significant economic harm to the beneficiary entities and individuals, a vast 
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number of whom are retirees.258 This is because the mortgage loans that are 
conveyed into RMBS trusts are carefully structured with the expectation that 
most homeowners will stay in their homes and continue to pay their 
mortgages.259 Representative John Campbell, a Republican from California, 
said that “the savers and retirees who own these mortgages, many of them 
through their pension funds and 401(k) accounts, would be exposed to serious 
losses” if Richmond goes through with its plan.260 
While the Richmond Plan has the potential to harm the holders of the 
RMBS trusts, the plan will likely benefit a different group of investors. 
B. An Unjust Windfall 
Critics are concerned that Richmond’s plan targets loans that are currently 
performing and have a low risk of default, which they predict would result in 
significant losses to the mortgage holders.261 After all, simply because a home 
has lost value due to the downturn of the housing market does not mean that its 
owners will not continue to make payments on the home.262 In fact, 
approximately 70% (444 of 624) of the homes targeted are current on their 
payments.263 If cities have the power to seize loans—even performing loans—
when the market declines, lenders will be forced to change their practices.264 
Specifically, lenders will be forced to react by issuing loans with more 
demanding terms that will exclude some from obtaining loans and purchasing 
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homes.265 This will harm housing markets, as lenders will be forced to reduce 
the available residential loan credit and interest rates will go up.266 
Even among homeowners in Richmond, the plan may favor certain loans. 
Jeff Wright, a Richmond real estate agent who opposes the plan, believes that 
in reality, the plan will not even affect the majority of mortgages because 
eminent domain will not be used to help anyone with loans backed by Fannie 
Mae or Freddie Mac.267 Further, the Richmond Plan does not target loans held 
by banks.268 
Though the Richmond Plan stands to have a large impact on the residents 
of Richmond and on the investors who happen to own mortgages in the city, its 
effects could be felt much further if other cities decide to follow suit. 
C. A Snowball Effect 
Critics worry that if Richmond’s plan is successful, other cities will follow 
in their footsteps, creating a snowball effect.269 Mayor McLaughlin assures that 
the plan’s use of eminent domain would only occur in “exceptional 
circumstances when large numbers of households are underwater;”270 yet the 
law does not always work this way. If the banks’ lawsuit fails and Richmond is 
allowed to use eminent domain to break private contracts for the public good, 
it may be difficult to define “exceptional circumstances” in the future—
especially through case law, which is necessarily fact-specific and is often an 
improper vehicle for creating broad policies. The FHFA further worries that 
administering a program will drain judicial resources and will be rife with 
administrative and judicial costs and fees.271 
Several other cities have already considered the use of eminent domain to 
take underwater mortgages. MRP’s eminent domain proposal has been 
considered by local governments in California like San Bernardino County, El 
Monte, La Puente, San Joaquin, and Orange Cove as well as by North Las 
Vegas, NV, Newark, NJ, Seattle, WA, and others.272 Mayor Wayne Smith of 
Irvington, New Jersey, has followed Richmond’s example and plans to move 
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forward with using eminent domain to take underwater homes.273 Irvington 
plans to target the approximately 1,000 “private-label” mortgages as opposed 
to going after Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.274 Smith thinks that by targeting 
mortgages held by banks and investors, the city may be able to avoid some of 
the legal challenges of using eminent domain.275 Unlike Richmond, Irvington 
has not yet agreed to work with MRP on its eminent domain plan and is 
seeking investor proposals.276 Irvington asserts that the process will be fair, 
open, and competitive,277 potentially shielding the city from some of the 
“public use” challenges faced by Richmond. 
Not only is there concern that other cities will follow suit to take 
mortgages, but there is also concern that eminent domain could be used to 
acquire different types of loans—for example, underwater car loans, 
underwater student loans, and credit card debt.278 If other cities follow suit, or 
if this legal precedent allows cities to take different types of debt for less than 
its face value, the banks worry that the damages to RMBS trusts would exceed 
billions of dollars.279 
In the face of such staggering potential consequences, opponents are taking 
the Richmond Plan seriously, combating it both through the legal system and 
through investment decisions. 
D. A Chilling Reality 
In an effort to avoid or minimize further losses, many investors have 
expressed their hesitance in lending to communities like Richmond that plan to 
use eminent domain to take mortgages. Whether for punishment, self-
preservation, or both, the withholding of financing could have great 
consequences for the citizens of these communities. In a public statement, the 
FHFA said it “has significant concerns about the use of eminent domain to 
revise existing financial contracts,” worrying that the resulting losses would 
“represent a cost ultimately born by taxpayers” and would have “a chilling 
effect on the extension of credit to borrowers seeking to become homeowners 
and on investors that support the housing markets.”280 This is because if any 
mortgage loans, even those that are highest performing, could be seized by 
local governments at substantial discounts, investors will be wary of 
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purchasing the mortgage loans and lending banks will protect themselves by 
offering loans with onerous terms.281 
Officials from the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association 
(SIFMA) have pointed to history to show the dangers of interfering.282 In 2002, 
the Georgia mortgage market shrank by roughly 15% when the legislature 
passed a law intended to prevent lenders from steering consumers to high-
interest loans.283 Though the law was intended to help Georgia consumers, 
lenders opposed the bill, arguing that it would inhibit their ability to make 
loans to people with bad credit.284 Some lenders pulled out of the state 
altogether, and two ratings agencies said that because they could be sued under 
the law, they would be unable to rate Georgia loans for resale to investors.285 
Despite investors’ fears, most typical thirty-year mortgages were unaffected, 
and some believe that had the law remained in place, it would have mitigated 
the housing crisis.286 Proponents of the Richmond Plan argue that ultimately, 
any initial chilling will be short-lived because they will offer a good enough 
deal to entice investors to lend.287 
As this article has already touched upon, even a group of realtors from the 
Richmond community has banded together in opposition of the city’s plan.288 
The realtors have created a pamphlet entitled Don’t Let Wall Street Take 
Another Bite Out of Richmond Homes that they sent to members of the 
community, and they even launched a website called 
StopInvestorGreed.com.289 The realtor group’s spokesman, Jeff Wright, has 
been part of Richmond’s realty business for thirty years and is the former 
president of the West Contra Costa Association of REALTORS.290 He worries 
that the “MRP and Wall Street Investors’ plan to seize Richmond’s underwater 
mortgages will backfire and seriously harm the value of homes in 
Richmond.”291 Most importantly, the realtor group is concerned that if 
Richmond’s plan is followed, investors will react by refusing to lend to 
Richmond and its citizens.292 
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There is some support for this argument, as investors refused to bite at a 
$34 million bond issuance that the city tried to pass in July of 2014.293 Wright 
likened Richmond’s bonds to a “dented can,” hypothesizing that investors will 
refuse to lend in Richmond’s jurisdiction if there is a threat of taking and will 
choose instead to invest in other markets.294 Scott Simon, a former managing 
director of Pimco, reinforced this sentiment, questioning why a lender would 
invest in an area willing to say, “I know you lent someone $100, but we are 
going to say you only get $50.”295 Jonathan Lieberman, head of residential 
mortgage investing at Angelo, Gordon & Co., agreed, asserting that investors 
“cannot invest where [their] money is going to be expropriated—that’s a key 
tenet of investing.”296 Yet the Richmond Plan may chill investments at a time 
when the market is already on the upswing. 
E. Too Much and Too Late 
Beyond all of the legal and practical consequences of the Richmond Plan 
looming, many believe the proposed solution is coming too late. Critics of the 
eminent domain plan believe that the housing market will take care of itself.297 
Jeff Wright and his colleagues believe that there is no inherent harm in 
foreclosure.298 If someone defaults and leaves, Richmond’s market is hot 
enough that another buyer will take his or her place.299 The housing market is 
on the upturn.300 The realtor group believes that there are better alternatives 
and that lenders will likely work with homeowners if the homeowners are 
willing to make payments.301 
In January 2014, more than half of the 624 homeowners whose mortgages 
Richmond planned to take through eminent domain were current on their 
payments.302 Though about 28% of Richmond mortgages are deeply 
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underwater,303 ninety-one of the targeted loans have received loan modification 
including debt forgiveness, though not all modifications have been 
sustainable.304 One-third of the homeowners initially identified are no longer 
underwater, according to critics of the Richmond Plan, though MRP disputes 
this figure.305 The mortgage crisis seems to be improving across the United 
States.306 Nationwide, from the first quarter to the second quarter of 2013, the 
number of properties with negative equities has gone from 9.6 million (19.7%) 
residential properties with a mortgage to 7.1 million (14.5%) residential 
properties with a mortgage.307 Critics of the eminent domain plan believe that 
the housing market will take care of itself.308 
VIII.  FINAL THOUGHTS 
Richmond and cities like it have been hit hard by the burst of the housing 
bubble and the great recession, meriting a real solution. However, despite the 
boldness and creativity of the Richmond Plan, it simply poses too many legal 
and practical consequences to be practicable at this point in time. Even if the 
plan is able to overcome the constitutional challenges, its implementation will 
ultimately come with great costs—costs that will be borne in large part by the 
private citizens the plan aims to help. Thus, because of its constitutional and 
practical consequences, the Richmond Plan will bring more harm than good. 
EMILY C. CORY 
  
 
 303. A home is “deeply underwater” when a homeowner owes significantly more than his or 
her home is worth. Richmond’s 28% figure for deeply underwater homes is higher than the 
national average, which stood at 19% in January 2014. Id. 
 304. Id. 
 305. Id. 
 306. Id. 
 307. CORELOGIC, EQUITY REPORT: SECOND QUARTER 2013, at 2 (2013), available at 
http://www.corelogic.com/research/negative-equity/corelogic-q2-2013-equity-report.pdf. 
 308. George, supra note 297. 
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